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Abstract.   The paper examines some central issues 
concerning the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) and 
the notion of instantiating a computational formalism in 
the physical world. I address a standard line of criticism of 
CTM, based on the claim that the notion of instantiating a 
computational formalism is overly liberal to the point of 
vacuity, and conclude that Searle’s view that computation 
is not an intrinsic property of physical systems is 
ultimately correct. I argue that for interesting and 
powerful cases, realization is only ever a matter of 
approximation and degree, and interpreting a physical 
device as performing a computation is relative to our 
purposes and potential epistemic gains. However, while 
this may fatally undermine a computational explanation of 
conscious experience, I contend that, contra Putnam and 
Searle, it does not rule out the possibility of a 
scientifically justified account of propositional attitude 
states in computational terms.   
1
the  
1     FORMALISM AND ARTEFACT 
From an abstract mathematical perspective, 
computation comprises an extremely well 
defined and stable phenomenon. Central to the 
theory of computation is the intuitive notion of 
an effective or ‘mechanical’ procedure, which is 
simply a finite set of instructions for syntactic 
manipulations that can be followed by a 
machine, or by a human being who is capable of 
carrying out only very elementary operations on 
symbols. A key constraint is that the machine or 
the human can follow the rules without knowing 
what the symbols mean. The notion of an 
effective procedure is obviously quite general – 
it doesn’t specify what form the instructions 
should take, what the manipulated symbols 
should look like, nor precisely what 
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manipulations are involved. The underlying 
restriction is simply that they are finitary and 
can proceed ‘mindlessly’ i.e. without any 
additional interpretation or understanding.  So 
there are any number of different possible 
frameworks for filling in the details and making 
the notion rigorous and precise. Turing’s 
‘automatic computing machines’ [1] (TMs), 
supply a very intuitive and elegant rendition of 
the notion of an effective procedure. But there is 
a variety of alternative frameworks, including 
Church’s Lambda Calculus, Gödel’s Recursive 
Function Theory, Lambek’s Infinite Abacus 
Machines, etc.  
According to the widely accepted 
Church-Turing thesis, the class of computable 
functions is captured in an absolute sense by the 
notion of TM computability, and compelling 
‘inductive evidence’ for the thesis is supplied by 
the fact that every alternative formalization so 
far given of the broad intuitive notion of an 
effective procedure has been demonstrated to be 
equivalently powerful, and hence to specify 
exactly the same class of functions [2]. Thus the 
idealized notion of in-principle computability, 
where all finite bounds on input size, storage 
capacity and length of running time are 
abstracted away, seems to constitute a 
fundamental category, a stable and highly 
pleasing ‘mathematical kind’. 
A related further question to ask is 
whether any sort of comparable feature carries 
over to computation as implemented or realized 
in the physical universe. Turing machines and 
other types of computational formalisms are 
mathematical abstractions. Like equations, sets, 
Euclid’s perfectly straight lines, etc., TMs don’t 
exist in real time or space, and they have no 
causal powers. In order to perform actual 
computations, an abstract Turing machine, 
thought of as a formal program of instructions, 
must be realized or instantiated by a suitable 
arrangement of matter and energy. And as 
Turing observed long ago [3], there is no 
privileged or unique way to do this. Like other 
abstract structures, such as chess games and 
isosceles triangles, Turing machines are multiply 
realizable - what unites different types of 
physical implementation of the same abstract 
TM is nothing that they have in common as 
physical systems, but rather a structural 
isomorphism in terms of a particular level of 
description. Hence it’s possible to implement the 
very same computational formalism using 
modern electronic circuitry, a human being 
executing the instructions by hand with paper 
and pencil, a Victorian system of gears and 
levers, as well as more atypical arrangements of 
matter and energy including toilet paper and 
beer cans. Let us call this ‘downward’ multiple 
realizability, wherein, for any given formal 
procedure, this same abstract computational 
formalism can be implemented via an arbitrary 
number of distinct physical systems. And let us 
denote this type of downward multiple 
realizability as ‘↓MR’.  
After the essential foundations of the 
mathematical theory of computation were laid, 
the vital issue then became one of engineering – 
how best to utilize state of the art technology to 
construct rapid and powerful physical 
implementations of the abstract mathematical 
blueprints, and hence perform actual high speed 
computations automatically. This is a clear and 
deliberate ↓MR endeavour, involving the 
intentional construction of artefacts, 
painstakingly designed to follow the algorithms 
that we have created. From this top-down 
perspective, there is an obvious and 
pragmatically indispensible sense in which the 
hardware that we have designed and built can be 
said to perform genuine computations in 
physical space-time.    
2     COMPUTATION IN NATURE   
In addition to these comparatively recent 
engineering achievements, but presumably still 
members of a single underlying category of 
phenomenon, various authors and disciplines 
propound the notion of ‘natural computation’ 
(NC), and invoke a host of indigenous processes 
as cases in point, including neural computation, 
DNA computing, biological evolution, 
molecular and membrane computing, slime 
mould growth, ant swarm optimization, 
‘embedded and pervasive computation’, etc. 
According to such views, computation in the 
physical world is not merely artificial – it is not 
restricted to the devices specifically designed 
and constructed by human beings. Instead, 
computation is a seemingly ubiquitous feature of 
the natural order, and the artefacts invented by 
us constitute only a very small subset of the 
class of computational systems in the physical 
world. 
The disciplinary and terminological 
practices surrounding NC invite a more 
thorough and rigorous examination of the 
underlying assumptions involved. To what 
extent is computation a genuine natural kind – 
is there any intrinsic unity or core of traits 
systematically held in common by the myriad of 
purported examples of computation in nature? 
This question has deep and independent 
conceptual significance, in an attempt to gain 
clarity on whether and to what extent 
computation can be cogently and fruitfully seen 
as a natural occurrence. In what sense, if any, 
can computation be said to take place 
spontaneously, as a truly native, ‘bottom-up’ 
phenomenon? And of course, the issue has 
special philosophical interest with respect to 
positions on the conjectured computational 
nature of mentality and cognition. It is this 
particular domain that will comprise the primary 
focal point of the paper, within the broader 
context just outlined.  
3    THE COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF    
MIND (CTM) 
According to the widely embraced 
‘computational paradigm’, which underpins 
cognitive science, Strong AI and various allied 
positions in the philosophy of mind, 
computation (of one sort or another) is held to 
provide the scientific key to explaining and 
artificially reproducing mentality. The paradigm 
maintains that cognitive processes are 
essentially computational processes, and hence 
that intelligence in the physical world arises 
when a material system implements the 
appropriate kind of computational formalism. In 
terms of the classical model of computation as 
rule governed symbol manipulation, the relation 
between the abstract program level and its 
realization in physical hardware then yields an 
elegant solution to the traditional mind-body 
problem in philosophy: the mind is to the brain 
as a program is to the hardware of a digital 
computer.  
It’s an immediate corollary of CTM that 
the human brain counts as an exemplary 
instance of NC. However, CTM seems to 
require a more robust and literal stand on 
computation than that embraced by NC in 
general. It is crucial to recognize the distinction 
(as pointed out by, e.g. Gualtiero Piccinini [4]) 
between being a system/process that can be 
effectively simulated or modelled using a 
computational formalism and being a 
system/process that literally instantiates a 
computational procedure or executes an 
algorithm. Most purported cases of ‘natural 
computation’ in a scientific context are versions 
of the former and not the latter. It is clear that 
the brain can be viewed as a case of NC in this 
simulational or modelling sense. However, I 
take it that serious proponents of CTM would 
advocate a more substantive position, viz., that 
human mentality arises because the brain 
literally instantiates computational procedures 
and transforms symbol structures in a manner 
comparable to a computational artefact rather 
than a computer simulated thunderstorm.  
According to CTM, mental states and 
properties are seen as complex internal 
processing states, which computationally 
interact within a system of internal state 
transitions, thereby mediating the inputs and 
outputs of  intelligent behaviour. Hence any 
mental process leading to an action will have to 
be embodied as a physical brain process that 
realizes the underlying computational 
formalism. A perceived virtue of this approach 
is that it can potentially provide a universal 
theory of cognition, a theory which is not 
limited by the details and peculiarities of the 
human organism. Since mentality is explained in 
computational terms, and, as above, 
computational formalisms are multiply 
realizable, it follows that the mind-program 
analogy can be applied to any number of 
different types of creatures and agents. 
Combining CTM with ↓MR, it follows that a 
human, a Martian and a robot could all be in 
exactly the same mental state, where this 
sameness is captured in terms of implementing 
the same cognitive computation, albeit via 
radically different forms of physical hardware. 
So on this view, computation is seen as 
providing the scientific paradigm for explaining 
mentality in general – all cognition is to be 
literally described and understood in 
computational terms.   
4     ANYTHING COMPUTES EVERYTHING  
But rather than viewing ↓MR as a theoretical 
virtue promising a universal account of 
mentality, opponents of CTM target ↓MR as its 
Achilles heel. In Representation and Reality, 
Hilary Putnam [5] argues that implementing a 
computational formalism cannot serve as the 
theoretical criterion of mentality, because such a 
standard is overly liberal to the point of vacuity. 
As a case in point he offers a proof of the thesis 
that every open physical system can be 
interpreted as the realization of every finite state 
automaton. In a related vein, John Searle [6] 
argues that computation is not an intrinsic 
property of physical systems. Instead, it an 
observer relative interpretation that we project 
on to various physical systems according to our 
interests and goals.  
Searle contends that this makes CTM 
vacuous, because virtually any physical system 
can be interpreted as following virtually any 
program. Thus hurricanes, our digestive system, 
the motion of the planets, even an apparently 
inert lecture stand, all possess a level of 
description at which they instantiate any number 
of different programs – but it is absurd to 
attribute mental states and intelligence to them 
on that basis. Even though the stomach has 
inputs, internal processing states and outputs, it 
isn’t a cognitive system. Yet if one wanted to, 
one could interpret the inputs and outputs as 
code for any number of symbolic processes. 
And in his article ‘Is the Brain a Digital 
Computer’ [7] Searle attempts to illustrate the 
extreme conceptual looseness of the notion of 
implementing an abstract formalism by 
famously claiming that the molecules in his wall 
could be interpreted as running the word star 
program. 
Let us label multiple realizability in this 
direction, wherein any given physical system can 
be interpreted as implementing an arbitrary 
number of different computational formalisms 
‘upward MR’ and denote it as ‘↑MR’. The basic 
import of ↑MR is the non-uniqueness of 
computational ascriptions to particular physical 
systems. In the extreme versions suggested by 
Putnam and Searle, there are apparently no 
significant constraints whatever – it is possible 
in principle to interpret every open physical 
system as realizing every computational 
procedure. Let us call this extreme version 
‘universal upward MR’ and denote it as 
‘↑MR*’. If every physical system can be 
construed as implementing every computational 
formalism, then clearly every computational 
formalism is realized by every physical system, 
and the corresponding position in the other 
direction, i.e. ↓MR*, is also true. So in this 
sense the two positions are equivalent and 
↑MR* = ↓MR*.   
But mere ↑MR is weaker than ↑MR*, 
since the former does not assert that there are no 
salient constraints, and hence ↑MR would be 
consistent with the denial that, e.g., the 
molecules in Searle’s wall can in fact be 
interpreted as implementing the word star 
program, if we place the proper qualifications on 
the notion of implementation (although every 
physical system might still be interpretable as 
implementing some very large set of distinct 
computations). What ↑MR denies is simply that 
any particular computational description that can 
be legitimately applied is somehow privileged or 
unique. 
5     SOME CONTRAINTS ARE IN ORDER 
In response to the Putnam/Searle universal 
realizability objection, various defenders of 
CTM attempt to deny ↑MR* by (i) placing 
greater constraints on what counts as a 
legitimate physical realization and (ii) narrowing 
the set of computations relevant, since only very 
complex and advanced procedures will be of 
interest to CTM as candidates for mental 
architecture. Putnam’s proof involves inputless 
finite state automata, and these are commonly 
dismissed as too primitive. Full input/output 
capabilities are required, as well as rich internal 
processing structure, which calls for something 
on a par with, say, Jerry Fodor’s [8] Language 
of Thought (LOT) model of cognition. 
In line with strategy (i) above, David 
Chalmers [9] advocates what he takes to be two 
essential constraints in distinguishing many of 
the ‘false’ cases of implementation assumed by 
Putnam’s argument, from ‘true’ cases consistent 
with a non-trivial reading of CTM. The first is 
an appropriate causal structure relating the state 
transitions in the physical implementation of the 
computational formalism (this is also proposed 
by, e.g. Ronald Chrisley [10]) , and the second is 
the ability of the mapping to support 
counterfactual sequences of transitions on inputs 
not actually given (which is also considered by 
Tim Maudlin [11]). Both of these are quite 
significant features inviting extended analysis, 
which unfortunately is not possible within the 
confines of the current discussion. However, 
selected points regarding each of these proffered 
constraints will be touched on below. 
Chalmers argues that it is a necessary 
condition that the pattern of abstract state 
transitions constituting a particular run of the 
abstract computation on a particular input must 
map to an appropriate transition of physical 
states of the machine, where the relation 
between succeeding states in this sequence is 
governed by proper causal regularities. 
However, I would argue that this constraint is 
too strong in the general case. For example, in 
the Chinese room scenario, or indeed any 
situation where a human being is following an 
abstract computational procedure, the transition 
from one state to the next is not causal in any 
straightforward physical or mechanical sense. 
When I take a machine table set of instructions 
specifying a particular TM and then perform a 
given computation with pencil and paper by 
sketching the configuration of the tape at each 
step in the computation, the transitions sketched 
on the piece of paper are not causally connected: 
one sketch in the sequence in no way causes the 
next. It is only through my understanding and 
intentional choice to execute the procedure that 
the next state appears on the paper. Physical 
causation comes in only very indirectly, as in 
light rays illuminating the page and allowing me 
to see the symbols, and at an elementary and 
extraneous level, as in the friction between the 
pencil lead and the paper’s surface causing 
various marks to appear.  
Yet this is a perfectly legitimate and 
indeed paradigmatic case of implementing a 
Turing machine. In the Chinese room, it is 
merely through Searle’s understanding of 
English, his free choice to behave in a certain 
manner, and a number of highly disjointed 
physical processes (finding bits of paper in a 
certain location, turning the pages in the 
instruction manual, all mediated by the human 
agent) that the implementation takes place. In 
this case it counts as an implementation simply 
because what can be interpreted as the 
appropriate states in the procedure occur in the 
correct linear order. Questions regarding the 
mechanics of how they happen to occur are not 
relevant to answering the question of whether or 
not the procedure has been implemented. The 
physical how is a different question, and is not 
on the same level of analysis as that invoked 
when determining whether or not the desired 
mapping from formalism to physical 
configuration obtains. But this then critically 
loosens the requirements for counting a physical 
system as instantiating a program. As long as 
what can be described or interpreted as the 
correct sequence of states actually occurs, then 
the underlying mechanics of how this takes 
place are not strictly relevant. 
  The causal requirements advocated by 
Chalmers constitute a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition – in the general case we 
must still allow for chance and human agency to 
play a role. However, the right sort of causal 
regularities and connections are needed if the 
instantiation in question is to be fully automatic, 
and if we want to be able to rely on the 
automatic device to perform systematically 
correct computations yielding outputs with the 
potential to supply us with new information. 
And although this is the norm when constructing 
and interpreting computational artefacts, it does 
not exhaust the general space of possibilities. 
In response to Chalmers’ proposed 
counterfactual requirement, it is worth noting 
that for a physical system to realize a rich 
computational formalism with proper input and 
output capacities, such as an abstract TM, this 
will always be a matter of approximation. For 
example, any given physical device will have a 
finite upper bound on the size of input strings it 
is able to process, its storage capacities will 
likewise be severely limited, and so will its 
actual running time. In principle there are 
computations that formal TMs can perform 
which, even given the fastest and most powerful 
physical devices we could imagine, would take 
longer than the lifespan of our galaxy to execute. 
It will never be possible to construct a complete 
physical realization of an abstract TM – the 
extent to which the device can execute the full 
range of state transitions of which the 
abstraction is capable will always be a matter of 
degree. So in turn, the class of counterfactual 
cases on alternative inputs with which the 
realization can cope is by necessity limited – not 
all counterfactual cases will be supported by any 
physical device implementing a TM.  
Consequently, there is no simple or 
principled cut off point demarking ‘genuine’ 
implementations from ‘false’ ones in terms of 
counterfactual considerations. Take a standard 
pocket calculator that can intake numbers up to, 
say, 6 digits in decimal notion. Is this a ‘false’ 
realization of the corresponding algorithm for 
addition, since it can’t calculate 106 + 106? It’s 
an approximate instantiation which is 
nonetheless exceedingly useful for everyday 
sums. It will always be a matter of degree how 
many counterfactuals can be supported, where a 
single run on one inputV is the degenerate case. 
Where in principle can the line be drawn after 
that? It’s a matter of our purposes and goals as 
interpreters and epistemic agents, and is not an 
objective question about the ‘true’ nature of the 
physical device as an implementation. In some 
cases we might only be interested in the answer 
for a single input, a single run 
Hence for a physical device to 
successfully ‘perform a computation’ is distinct 
from ‘fully instantiating a computational 
formalism’. Performing a computation is an 
occurrent event, an actual sequence of physical 
state transitions yielding an output value, 
whereas instantiating a complete computational 
formalism is much more stringent and 
hypothetical, requiring appeal to counterfactuals, 
and as above, this will only obtain as a matter of 
degree. In light of this distinction, it is clearly 
possible for a physical device to successfully 
perform a computation without instantiating a 
complete computational formalism. 
6     OBSERVER RELATIVITY 
One of Searle’s basic claims is the allied tenet 
that computation is not an ‘intrinsic’ property of 
physical systems – instead it’s an observer 
relative act of interpretation. This basic point 
has been objected to in different ways, and is 
itself in need of clarification. The latter part of 
Searle’s claim may seem to suggest that it is a 
purely subjective matter, and Ned Block [12] 
objects by pointing out that it’s simply not the 
case that anything goes. As an illustration, he 
notes that, although it’s possible to reinterpret an 
inclusive OR gate as an AND gate by flipping 
our interpretations of the values of ‘0’ and ‘1’, 
it’s simply not possible to reinterpret an 
inclusive OR gate as an exclusive OR gate. So 
although we have a great deal of latitude about 
how we interpret a device, there are also very 
important restrictions on this freedom, and 
according to Block, this makes it a substantive 
claim that, e.g., the human brain is a computer 
of a certain sort.  
Block’s position suggests that there are 
two important strands here that need to be 
separated. ‘Observer relative’ could mean that 
it’s totally subjective and anything goes, which 
is the claim he wants to deny. But it could also 
mean something more curtailed, viz., that the 
attribution of computational activity requires an 
observer to supply the interpretation. This 
doesn’t mean that the interpretation doesn’t have 
to satisfy various objective constraints supplied 
by the given characterization of the system. It 
simply means that, as Searle also says, it’s not 
intrinsic to the system itself, and must be 
provided by the observer as an outside 
ascription. Hence it’s easy to reinterpret an 
inclusive OR gate as an AND gate – there is no 
objective fact to the matter as to which truth 
function is being computed, and this is in perfect 
accord with ↑MR. Some interpretations appear 
to be excluded (on the very pivotal assumption 
that the physical system itself is characterized as 
an ‘inclusive OR gate’ and not as something 
more fundamental), which seems to cast some 
doubt on ↑MR*. In the present discussion I will 
not argue for or against ↑MR* (see Mark Bishop 
[13], [14] for an interesting version of the claim) 
but instead confine my considerations to the 
more modest ↑MR.  
In view of ↑MR, it’s still never the case 
that any given computational interpretation of a 
physical system is privileged or unique, and this 
seems far more difficult to deny than ↑MR*. 
And the non-intrinsic nature of computation is a 
direct consequence of ↑MR. As long as there are 
at least two distinct interpretations, there is no 
objective fact of the matter regarding which 
computation is being performed, and it follows 
that the computation itself is not an intrinsic 
property of the physical device. Instead, it is an 
act of human interpretation, and is usually 
tethered to issues involving design and 
engineering, relative to our purposes and 
interests. Thus implementation is always a 
matter of both interpretation and degree of 
approximation, and its usefulness will depend on 
our interests and epistemic needs (e.g. as above - 
how big a counterfactual set of inputs we want it 
to be able to compute). 
It’s certainly true that there is no 
pragmatic value in most interpretive exercises 
compatible with ↑MR and ↑MR*, e.g. post hoc 
attributions of single runs, or any case where we 
know the outcomes in advance of the 
interpretation. Physically instantiated 
computation is useful to us only insofar as it 
supplies informative outputs, which in most 
cases will come down to new information 
acquired as a result of the implemented 
calculation. Interesting observer relative 
computation takes place when we can directly 
read-off something that follows from the 
formalism, but which we didn’t already know in 
advance and explicitly incorporate into the 
mapping from the start. That’s the incredible 
value of our computational artefacts, and it’s the 
only practical motivation for playing the 
interpretation game in the first place  
Of course, this doesn’t mean that we 
cannot ascribe other interpretations to the same 
system – the difference is that in most cases the 
outputs will then be of no pragmatic or 
epistemic value to us. But this is still something 
relative to our human interests, practices and 
goals – the success of the strategy is based on 
objective features of the system (typically that 
we have designed and built), but this does not 
make computation itself intrinsic – it is still an 
interpretation, an abstract level of description, 
and as such is neither canonical nor unique. 
Indeed, computation is no more an intrinsic 
property of a physical systems than is ‘being a 
sequence of inscriptions constituting a formal 
derivation of a theorem in first-order logic’.  
In line with this logic/formal proof 
example, when I execute a particular TM 
computation by drawing the initial tape 
configuration on a piece of paper, then write 
down the tape configuration for each step in the 
computation according to the instructions in the 
machine table until I reach a halting 
configuration and stop, the physical states 
realizing the computation are a sequence of 
scratch marks on a two dimensional sheet of 
paper. There is nothing physical about these 
scratched in patterns that is intrinsically 
computational – indeed, the shapes could be 
interpreted in any manner one likes or not at all. 
The computational interpretation of the physical 
scratch mark is purely extrinsic. And this is the 
same for syntactic interpretations in general – 
e.g. being an instance of the spoken English 
sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ is not an 
intrinsic property of the sound waves 
constituting an instantiating utterance. 
Physical systems as such are intrinsically 
rule (i.e. physical law) obeying while formal 
systems are intrinsically rule following.  In the 
case of our computational artefacts, a rule 
obeying system must be deliberately engineered 
so that it can be interpreted as isomorphic in the 
relevant sense to a chosen rule following formal 
system. Rule obeying is an essentially 
descriptive matter and there is no sense in which 
mistakes or error can be involved – physical law 
cannot be broken, and the time evolution of 
natural systems is wholly determined (in the 
classical case at least) by the laws obeyed. Rule 
following on the other hand is an essentially 
normative matter and there is a vital sense in 
which error and malfunction can occur. If my 
desk top machine is dosed with petrol and set on 
fire while still in operation, the time evolution of 
the hardware will remain in perfect descriptive 
accord with natural law. However, it will very 
soon fail to comply with the normative 
requirements of implementing Microsoft Word, 
and serious computational malfunctions will 
ensue. Being an implementation of Microsoft 
Word is a normative and provisional 
interpretation of the hardware system, which can 
be withdrawn when something goes ‘wrong’ or 
when the system is disrupted by non-design 
intended forces - being an implementation of 
Microsoft Word is not intrinsic to the physical 
structure itself. 
7     COMPUTATION AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
Many versions of CTM focus solely on the 
functional analysis of propositional attitude 
states such as belief and desire, and simply 
ignore other aspects of the mind, most notably 
consciousness and qualitative experience – 
Fodor’s LOT is a classic case in point. However 
others, such as William Lycan [15], try to 
extend the reach of Strong AI and the 
computational paradigm, and contend that 
conscious states arise via the implementation of 
the appropriate computational formalism. This 
then invites reapplication of the Putnam/Searle 
line in the ↓MR* direction, with the rejoinder 
that every open physical system implements the 
‘appropriate computational formalism’, so that 
consciousness is everywhere. According to this 
polemical strategy, rampant panpsychism 
follows as a consequence of CTM extended to 
the explanation of consciousness (which will be 
dubbed ‘CTM+’), and this is taken as a reductio 
ad absurdum refutation of such views. 
A natural line of defense for CTM+ is to 
invoke the counterfactual constraint above in 
order to deny ↓MR*. Only highly sophisticated 
physical systems (such as brains, presumably) 
are able to support all the counterfactuals 
required to count as an implementation of the 
appropriate computational formalism, and hence 
the attempted reductio is blocked. But as 
Maudlin and Bishop have argued, this is a 
highly dubious strategy in the case of conscious 
states, sense these are essentially occurrent 
phenomena, and the invocation of non-occurrent 
process seems to verge on the occult. As Bishop 
rightly observes, the appeal to counterfactuals 
seems to require a non-physical link between 
non-entered states and the resulting conscious 
experiences of the system.  
And I would agree that for conscious 
states counterfactuals don’t matter – it’s only the 
actual run that could have any bearing, so that 
the foregoing attempted defense of CTM+ is 
unsuccessful. Additionally, I would argue that 
the computational account of consciousness is 
fundamentally wrong in any case, and that even 
given the implementation of all purportedly 
relevant counterfactuals, this would still not 
constitute a sufficient condition for the presence 
of conscious experience. As above, computation 
is not an intrinsic property of physical systems, 
and so is inherently unsuited to serve as the 
foundation for conscious experience, which 
should be based on intrinsic properties of the 
brain as a physical system. As I’ve argued 
elsewhere ([16], [17]), propositional attitudes 
are potentially explainable in terms of 
functional/computational structure, which is 
abstract and multiply realizable (because non-
intrinsic!). In contrast, conscious states, if they 
occur in a given implementation, should be 
explained in terms of the intrinsic physical 
properties of the medium of instantiation.  
This is because, unlike computational 
formalisms, conscious states are inherently non-
abstract; they are actual, occurrent phenomena 
extended in physical time. The computational 
camp makes a critical error by espousing ↓MR 
as a hallmark of their theory, while at the same 
time contending that qualitatively identical 
conscious states are maintained across wildly 
different kinds of physical realization. The latter 
is the claim that an actual, substantive and 
invariant phenomenon is preserved overly 
radically diverse real systems, while the former 
is the claim that no internal physical regularities 
need to be preserved. And this implies that there 
is no actual, internal property that serves as the 
causal substrate or supervenience base for the 
substantive, invariant phenomenon in question. 
The advocate of CTM+ cannot rejoin that it is 
formal role which supplies this basis, since 
formal role is abstract, and such abstract features 
can only be instantiated via actual properties, 
but they do not have the power to produce them. 
The only (possible) non-abstract effects that 
instantiated formalisms are required to preserve 
must be specified in terms of their input/output 
profiles, and thus internal experiences, qua 
actual events, are in principle omitted. Hence it 
would appear that the actual, occurrent nature of 
conscious states entails that they must depend 
upon intrinsic properties of the physical world. 
 
8     OBSERVER RELATIVITY AND CTM 
 
However, content laden propositional attitudes 
are highly dispositional in character, and for 
such abstract, dispositional states, the relevant 
counterfactuals pertaining to formal processing 
structure do matter. If we restrict CTM to the 
belief-desire framework commonly assumed to 
characterize intentional systems, and leave 
consciousness out of its purview, then it is 
possible to give an account of how this type of 
approach could, at least in principle, offer us an 
effective theoretical handle on the mind. If we 
take something like Fodor’s LOT (as a starting 
point for the sake of illustration), this is at least 
the basic type of highly sophisticated and 
complex computational structure relevant to 
CTM. Propositional attitudes themselves are 
abstract, dispositional states, and their 
functional/computational rendition could in 
principle be interpreted as a computational level 
of description of the activities of the human 
brain. 
In line with the foregoing discussion, 
even if, for the sake of argument, we grant that 
the brain implemented Fodor’s LOT, still, this 
would not be an intrinsic property of the brain as 
a biochemical mechanism. Instead, it would be a 
scientifically fruitful and explanatorily powerful 
level of description, which could supply a 
unifying perspective that ties together actual 
brain function, seen as neurologically 
implementing relevant tokens of ‘mentalese’ 
symbols, and systematically manipulating these 
tokens in a manner consistent with the proffered 
computational formalism of LOT. This abstract 
level of description would then have to mesh 
with the salient input and output capabilities that 
we want to explain via this attribution of internal 
cognitive structure. So from a purely physical 
perspective, the inputs and outputs are various 
forms of energy bombarding the organism’s 
surface and emanating from it, and are not 
intrinsically computational either. But on the 
non-intrinsic cognitive level, these would be 
viewed as instances of written and spoken 
language, for example. And when interpreted as 
such, this non-intrinsic syntactic level will 
correspond to the internal processing activity 
triggered by the incoming energy pulse, 
interpreted as, say, a sentence in an English 
conversation.  
There would be no scientific interest in a 
mere a hoc mapping from LOT onto the brain 
(though in principle this may be possible, a la 
↓MR*). Instead, there would be a myriad of pre-
existing and empirically intransigent ‘wet-ware’ 
constraints that the mapping would have to 
satisfy, in order to correspond to the salient 
causal structure of brain activity as discovered 
by neuroscience. And as above, this would have 
to conform with observed input and output 
patterns interpreted symbolically, to yield 
successful predictions of both new outputs given 
novel inputs, and predictions correctly 
describing new brain configurations entailed by 
the theory as realizations of the appropriate 
formal transformations required to produce the 
predicted output. This would be real science, 
with two primary levels of empirical constraint 
satisfaction and experimental testing and 
confirmation, to establish or refute the accuracy 
of the proposed theoretical mapping. 
Additionally, the linguistic interpretation of 
input and output signals would have to mesh 
with corresponding objects and states of affairs 
in the agent’s environment, since in the human 
LOT case, we are studying and explaining an 
environmentally embedded system, and not a 
solipsistic syntax manipulator. 
If this CTM project were to turn out 
successful, then the LOT would be as powerful 
and well confirmed as a scientific venture could 
hope to be, and the objection that computation is 
still not an ‘intrinsic’ property of the brain 
would fade into irrelevance. It is in virtue of all 
of these factors considered together that human 
cognition could be accounted for in 
computational terms, and not simply in virtue of 
the brain being (in-principle) interpretable as 
realizing the LOT, by appeal to a mapping that 
ignores these crucial factors.  
9     CONCLUSION 
In accord with Searle, computation should be 
viewed as an extrinsic, observer relative feature 
of physical systems. As such, it does not 
constitute a stable or independent natural kind. 
Various natural phenomena can be modelled or 
simulated using computational techniques, but 
this is to be distinguished from the notion that 
the system itself spontaneously instantiates and 
executes a formal procedure. Natural systems 
are essentially rule obeying, and computational 
modelling simulates this in a fundamentally 
descriptive manner. In contrast, formal 
procedures are essentially normative, rule 
following structures, and in principle this 
interpretation can be projected onto natural 
systems in an almost limitless variety of ways. 
However, interesting and illuminating cases of 
computation realized in the physical world will 
come down to a question of engineering, either 
artificial or perhaps biological (to attain a 
robust, informative, non-post-hoc, multiple 
constraint satisfying degree of fit as a level of 
description for a physical system).  
It is conceivable that the human brain 
has been biologically engineered such that there 
exist interesting and informative levels of 
computational description in the above sense. 
Hence I would conclude that Searle’s basic point 
against CTM is not well taken. Although CTM+ 
and a computational theory of consciousness are 
ruled out, in the case of propositional attitude 
states, the non-intrinsic status of computation 
does not trivialize predictively successful 
ascriptions of formal structure, and multiple 
realizability on its own does not render CTM 
empirically vacuous.  
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